The article appears to discuss a new proposal for improving how ICS/OT cyber incidents are evaluated and reported, with the clear goal of reducing what the author sees as exaggerated or poorly grounded public narratives. From the available text, Vytautas Butrimas argues that when incidents occur in critical infrastructure, the first question should be how significant the event really was for the affected sector, and whether it resulted from malicious cyber activity, operator error, equipment failure, or some other cause. The piece seems to criticize the tendency for early reporting to inflate the meaning of incidents before technical facts are established, and it points toward a more disciplined, engineering-informed method for judging actual physical and operational impact rather than reacting to media-driven interpretations.

The article also appears to endorse the idea of an OT Incident Impact Score, likely as a standardized way to communicate severity in a form that is clearer, faster, and less vulnerable to hype. Based on the text I could verify, the broader message is that incident reporting in industrial environments should be anchored in process reality, technical validation, and the judgment of operators and engineers closest to the system, not just in cybersecurity or public-relations narratives. I could not retrieve the full original page because the site timed out, so this summary is based on the visible article preview and mirrored excerpt rather than the complete post itself.

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Source: http://scadamag.infracritical.com/index.php/2026/03/16/how-bad-was-it-this-time/