Control system cyber incidents, particularly those originating from even a single compromised or malfunctioning sensor system, can impact vast portions of the electric grid (or other critical infrastructures). Despite decades of lessons and warning signs, meaningful progress in securing power grid (and other critical infrastructure) control systems remains elusive. This failure stems from foundational misunderstandings in how we conceptualize control system cybersecurity. Without monitoring and validating sensor-level data at the physics layer, we will continue to mis or misattribute critical early warnings of catastrophic grid (or other critical infrastructure) events. A real-world example of grid vulnerability occurred when a single process sensor in a Florida combined-cycle power plant fed incorrect data to the turbine control system which caused turbine oscillations that triggered a resonance wave across the entire Eastern Interconnection resulting in power swings as far away as New England! This unintentional cyber incident mirrors the type of system design weakness that cyber attackers could exploit. This is especially important as the other US grid regions have similar design weaknesses (the also applies to international power grids and other critical infrastructures). Specific steps to address these gaps are provided.

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Source: http://scadamag.infracritical.com/index.php/2025/06/14/control-system-cyber-incidents-the-hidden-threat-to-grid-stability/