June 3-4, I will be participating in the ICS/SCADA Cybersecurity Symposium in Chicago. My two sessions will address important control system-unique issues not being addressed elsewhere. June 3^rd, I will be moderating a first-of-a-kind session bringing together a control system engineer and an OT network cybersecurity researcher to explore the cultural and operational divide between network security considerations and engineering considerations. The panelists will examine how the differing priorities and mindsets contribute to a persistent “culture chasm” and discuss innovative strategies for bridging these gaps. June 4^th, I will be participating in a session on cyberattacks addressing “physics-based” cyberattacks. Examples include Aurora which exploits a gap in protection of the electric grid without using any malware; the Stuxnet attack that compromised process sensor data which was not detected; and spoofed process sensor data that can compromise the operation of Chinese-made large electric transformers installed in the US electric grid. Unlike network cyberattacks, physics-based cyberattacks would appear to be equipment malfunctions leaving little to no cyber forensic trails.

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Source: http://scadamag.infracritical.com/index.php/2025/05/14/june-ics-scada-cybersecurity-symposium-to-address-unique-control-system-cyber-security-issues/